This page is dedicated to my father James Weston Hickey, along with all other brave men who fought in W.W.II to protect our freedom.

This copy of "A Short History of the 85th Mountain Infantry Regiment" was transcribed by Matt Douglas Hickey. When James Weston Hickey read the book for the first time in the summer of 1998 , he underlined parts which detailed his company or were of importance to him. Footnotes were added by James and are included in the following story.

My e-mail address is KB7PYE@aol.com

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A SHORT HISTORY

Our comrades in, 85th Mountain Infantry

who made the supreme sacrifice that we might

live as free men.

THE REGIMENTAL INSIGNIA

The three mountain peaks represent the battle for Mt. Belvedere, Mt. Gorgolesco and Mt. della Torraccia, the maiden engagement of the Regiment. The green valley and blue river in the foreground represent the Po Valley Campaign. "Sempre Avanti" has been adopted as the Regimental Motto. Translated into English from the Italian, it means, "Always Forward". This motto is particularly inspiring as it was the personal motto of PFC. Lorenz Koehler, Co L, who had the words carved on the stock of his "Tommy Gun". PFC. Koehler was killed in action while on patrol on the 4th of March, in the vicinity of Pra Del Bianca. He was an outstanding soldier and was awarded the Bronze Star Medal with Oak leaf cluster. The mountain sheep head is symbolic of those qualities of mind and body which the mountain soldier must possess. The skis, ice axe and climber's rope represent the mountain soldier equipment.

23 November, 1945

Members of the 85th Mountain Infantry, you should all retain a just pride and lasting satisfaction in your magnificent combat achievements and heroic sacrifices. You played a vital role in the success of the 10th Mountain Division. You spearheaded our first Division operation in the capture of Mount Gorgelesco and your advance to the base of Mount Torracia. You captured Monte della Spe and Mount Castellano and held these vital terrain features against determined counterattacks. You again spearheaded the Divisions' final attack on April 14th against the bulk of the German 334th Infantry Division, broke through their heavily mined and defended lines and captured heights which enabled the remainder of the Division to advance to the northeast. You played an important role in our advance to the Alps.

Your courage and determination are an inspiration to me and all members of the Division. I am proud of you and extend to each of you my best wishes for your future success and happiness.

 Major General, U.S.A.

Commanding

This history of the 85th Mountain Infantry has been Prepared for the officers and men who fought with the Regiment in Italy. In combat the individual sees the war largely in terms of his own personal experience. Seldom, if ever, does he learn of the action outside of his squad, platoon, or perhaps company. The main purpose of this history is to complete this Picture to present the action of the battalions and, in some cases, of individual companies; showing their role as members of the regimental team. Also, it is intended to be a source that may be referred to for the verification of dates and place names. In the years to come, may it recall experiences; renew old friendships; and reunite us in the bond of common purpose which we shared as members of the 85th.

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The 85th Mountain Infantry Regiment was activated originally as the 85th Infantry Regiment at Camp Hale, Colorado, on the 10th of August, 1943, with Colonel Raymond C. Barlow as the Regimental Commander. The cadre of non-commissioned officers and specialists, including several officers, came from the 27th Infantry Division. Approximately six hundred enlisted men and twenty company grade officers came from the 86th Infantry Regiment, stationed at Camp Hale. The remainder of the officers and enlisted men came from various replacement training centers throughout the country.

The Regiment was an element of what was then known as the 10th Light Division, later in the fall of 1944, to be redesignated the 10th Mountain Division.

At Camp Hale the training mission was: 'To be able to operate for extended periods over primitive terrain where road nets are scarce or non-existent, in deep snow and extreme cold'. In order to accomplish this mission, special types of clothing and equipment were used, in many cases especially designed. Skis and snowshoes facilitated individual movement over the deep snow, and the snow-weasel and mule provided organic transportation.

Ski instruction was conducted on the various slopes surrounding Camp Hale and, in the winter, bivouac area at Cooper Hill, on the Continental Divide. During the spring and summer months rock-climbing was taught on nearby mountains, ideally suited to this phase of training. Concurrent with such individual instruction, a series of proficiency tests was conducted for small units, culminating in the famous D-series for the entire Division in the spring of 1944.

This maneuver, which lasted five weeks, was perhaps the most grueling training test ever given to any U. S Army Division. It was performed under the most adverse and difficult weather conditions; in deep snow, in extreme cold, and with storms and high winds continually hampering individual efficiency. This particular training, which placed exceptional responsibility on the individual soldier, was essentially the best experience possible for the combat that lay ahead.

The Regiment arrived at Camp Swift, thirty miles East of Austin, Texas, during the last week of June 1944. All winter equipment-and to all appearances, all winter training-had been left behind at Camp Hale. The following six months in the 'flat-lands' were devoted to one primary objective-the organization and training of Heavy Weapons companies. This alteration in the Regiment's organization and equipment, required several months of specialized training; not only to achieve technical proficiency with the newly added heavy weapons, but also in solving the vastly increased problems of supply, which their addition created. This training became the primary mission of the Regiment during the final six months prior to shipment overseas.

It was not, of course, the only occupation at Camp Swift. The job was, as well, to master the problems of 'flat-land' fighting; to become acquainted with fire and maneuver in a type of terrain for which nothing at Camp Hale had prepared us. During the training at Camp Swift great emphasis proved to be of the utmost value later in combat. These problems were conducted using live ammunition and generally involved units no larger than a squad or platoon. Such consistent importance was attached to the training of these small units-their fire power, their maneuverability, and their ability to operate swiftly and independently-that by the end of the training period in Texas, each rifleman had a new concept of his place in his combat-team and of his relationship to the other members of his squad and platoon.

By mid-December, when everything was packed for shipment, the 85th was considered to be ready for combat. Training, of course, never actually ceased, but the intensive Preliminary phases were over. The morale of the 85th was high!

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A week at Camp Patrick Henry, Virginia, during which the Regiment had the dubious privilege of eating both its Christmas and New Year's dinners in a Port of Embarkation, preceded sailing out of Hampton Roads on the 4th of January. On 13 January, nine days after sailing, the USS West Point docked in Naples harbor. The following morning the Regiment (less Company "M" and Service Company, which went by coastal steamer) left Naples for Leghorn aboard Infantry Landing Craft and after four hurried days of final supply work at Pisa (where we received our motor vehicles) elements of the 1st and 2nd Battalions began working into the bitter winter line in the general vicinity of San Marcello. Both battalions relieved elements of our sister Regiment, the 86th Mountain Infantry, which had preceded us to Italy and into the line by a few weeks. However, the speed with which the 85th moved from its Port of Embarkation, into active combat patrolling-a movement that required only fifteen days -must surely establish some sort of record.

The main body of the Regiment cleared the Pisa Staging Area on 20 January, and later that day the Regimental Command Post had been established in the town of Limestre: here also were Headquarters and Service Companies. The 1st Battalion, under Lt. Col. Donald J. Wooley, set up headquarters in Bagni di Luccal :the 2nd Battalion, under Lt. Col. John P. Stone, moved to Gavinana; and the 3rd Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Warren S. Shelor, moved to Prunetta with the initial mission of continuing training. Immediately upon arrival in the lines, the Regiment was assigned to Task Force 45. Its mission, as ordered in Field Order No 6, Headquarters TF45, 19 January, 1945, was "To occupy, patrol, and be prepared to defend all of Task Force 45 area except that occupied by the 86th Mountain Infantry; continue training under existing conditions to include reconnaissance patrols and raids."

During this initial period, the lst Battalion concentrated its patrolling activities in an area on the Regiment's left flank in contact with the 92nd Division. The Battalion Command Post was at Bagni di Lucca, with the rifle companies and heavy weapons established in smaller villages from two to three miles north of the town. Company "A" (later replaced by Company "B") early established platoon outpost at Montefegatesi, and in time this northern-most village became the base of operations for most of the Battalion's patrolling and raiding operations. The entire sector of the Regiment was a quiet one, and one excellent for combat indoctrination and physical conditioning. The Apennines in this area are the most rugged mountains south of the Alps, rising to considerable heights, and during these winter months covered with several feet of snow. Foot-soldiering under those conditions was extremely difficult; the use of vehicles was limited-if not prohibited. Some of the winter equipment left behind at Camp Hale (a part of which was found in the hands of local Partisans) would have been very welcome.

Although the sector was a quiet one-that is, without major engagements-the lst Battalion was alerted on 23 January to prepare for possible enemy action in the neighboring, Serchio Valley, which had been the scene of a serious German breakthrough not many weeks earlier. Although the initial patrols were principally assigned reconnaissance missions, with a view toward a possible later attack toward Abetone (an important enemy town across the Alpe Tre Potenza Mountaino, just north of the existing lines), contact with the enemy was made in a decisive manner on 26 January. On this day a large combat patrol under Captain Charles P. Smith of Company "C" raided a group of houses known as Remissa. In this action the Regiment sustained its first fatality, Pfc. Walter Van Boven of Company "A": but the raid was successful inasmuch as the patrol killed one German and took two Germans and two Italian-Fascist prisoners. Company"C", supported by elements of Company "D", again engaged the enemy with even greater success on 30 January, with a second raid in the Remissa area. The success of this second venture can be measured as much by the difficulty involved in its execution as by the fact that it netted the Regiment six prisoners. To reach their objective the raiders were forced to make a long arduous climb over hard-crusted snow, and finally had to traverse an open, exposed slope cutting steps all the way.

The final action by the lst Battalion in this sector took place on 10 February, with a still more successful raid on an enemy strong-point at Berro al Fosso. This raid was undertaken by Company "B", under the joint leadership of Lt. Bruce Coggins and Lt. John G. Greaghe. This time the patrol killed one enemy and captured eleven prisoners and a number of enemy weapons. These three combat missions comprised the major activities of the lst Battalion during this opening month of fighting, but daily patrols, organized for both reconnaissance and combat purposes, were sent forth. Contact with the enemy was not often made, because he found the going equally difficult and was content to hold his advantage in well-entrenched positions.

During this same period, extending from 20 January to 12 February, the 2nd Battalion bad a similar mission in a sector to the right of the lst Battalion, with the Battalion Command Post established at Gavinana. The major effort of the Battalion took place on 5 February, with a successful raid on German bunkers on the summit of Monte Spigolino. The raid, under the leadership of Captain Otis F. Halversen, was launched in the very early morning, after a six hour night march through the mountains, and accounted for several more of the enemy in killed and wounded.

On or about 27 January, the 3rd Battalion entered the line, relieving the 2nd Battalion of the 86th Mountain Infantry. Their sector was in the Cutigliano area, and they started normal patrol activities immediately. Their first major effort took place on 30 January (the same day that Company "C", under Captain Smith made its second raid in the Remissa area) with a 22-man patrol led by Lt. Pieranuzzi of Company "I". Their mission was to attack enemy positions on Monte La Serra and to bring back prisoners. The enemy had extremely well prepared positions, and early opened up with interlocking automatic fires. Although one German was killed and an enemy officer wounded, we suffered our heaviest losses in this engagement; nine enlisted men taken prisoners, and four wounded who could not be evacuated because of hostile fire. The patrol was split by the heavy cross-fires and was forced to withdraw. One significant consequence of this action developed the following day. Nine Medical Corpsmen carrying the Geneva Convention flag, and wearing Red Cross helmets and Brossards, went in search of the wounded men. The Germans brought automatic-weapons fire on the rescue party, who withdrew to cover and then made a second attempt which was again repulsed by fire. This was the Regiment's first personal experience with this side of the enemy character, and it had, unquestionably, a profound effect on the state of mind with which we hereafter approached the German lines.

One more major attack was undertaken by the 3rd Battalion during this first month of combat. This was a daylight raid on Piansinatico by Company "K", reinforced by elements of Company "I", all under the command of Captain Cooper. The raiding party succeeded in getting to within about five hundred yards of its objective, but was subjected to small arms, automatic, and, later, mortar fire of such intensity that, after several casualties had been sustained (two men killed and six wounded), Captain Cooper ordered withdrawal. This action occurred on 4 February, and constituted the last engagement with the enemy during this period.

This had been a period in which each Battalion suffered casualties and had enjoyed only limited successes. It was one largely of training and indoctrination in the ways of fighting our enemy, and proved to be of incalculable value. We gained much experience by having actually been under enemy fire and our physical proficiency was greatly increased.

At the time of the Night Field Exercise, which took place on 12 February, east of Gavinana, and which marked the end of our preliminary phase of combat training, the majority of us felt that we were staging a dress rehearsal for an extremely important operation.

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CHAPTER 3.

Belvedere

Three mountain peaks, Mte Belvedere, Mte Gorgolesco, and Mte della Torraccia, dominated the tactical situation in the North Apennines in the spring of 1945. As long as the enemy held these peaks he protected all routes of approach to his supply and communication line, Highway 64 (The Pistoia-Bologna Road). They were also the highest terrain features remaining in his hands for his defense of the Po Valley, his most prized possession in Italy. Beyond them the terrain gradually slopes away until the Po Valley is reached forty miles away.

Three Allied efforts in the fall and winter of 1944 to capture Mte Belvedere and Mte Gorgolesco had been unsuccessful, but in the attempts, it was learned that the German would do anything within his power to hold, and by now he had had several more months to perfect his defenses.

Truly, this mountain-mass looked like an impregnable fortress for the enemy. His observation was perfect for miles in all directions and it was doubtful that a force, large enough in size to assure success, could be assembled in position to attack him without discovery. Such discovery, of course, would permit the enemy to man his carefully prepared positions. From these, because of their perfect observation, and because an attacker would have little cover on the naked slopes, the enemy could practically rest assured that his murderous artillery, mortar, and automatic weapons fire would repel any attack.

Fifth Army was well aware of the strength of this enemy position, but at the same time, it realized that some means must be found to capture these peaks, otherwise the Allied advance might be held up indefinitely, or be forced to turn to the west through even more difficult terrain.

The arrival of the 10th Mountain Division in Italy provided Fifth Army with the very tool for which it had been waiting these many months. Here was a fresh division, which had been specifically trained for mountain warfare, and if these peaks were ever to be taken, surely the 10th Mountain Division must do it.

Without further delay it was, therefore, decided that the 10th Mountain Division, under IV Corps, would attempt this operation during the second week in February.

The Division made the following plan for this operation:

To have the 86th seize the high ridge (Pizzo di Campiano-Mte Maunello) to the west of Belvedere on 19 February. This ridge (later christened Riva Ridge) had to be in Allied hands before the main effort could begin, since it afforded the enemy observation on all our routes of attack. The 87th Regiment was to move parallel to the 85th on its left flank, and to take the Valpiana Ridge, running northwest from Belvedere. The 85th was made the spearhead of the entire operation, with its mission to seize, as initial objectives, both Mte Belvedere and Mte Gorgolesco, and then to proceed down the northeast ridge and to take Mte della Torraccia. This was announced as a limited-objective attack, and would stop for the time being on this last of the three peaks.

With the receipt of the Division plan, Colonel Barlow and his staff reconnoitered this area on 9 February. This reconnaissance revealed the enormity of the task which now confronted the Regiment. The Regimental Commander was faced with the perplexing problem of how best to employ the battalions of the Regiment in attacking this citadel.

The Regimental plan finally decided upon was to have the 3rd Battalion assault Mte Belvedere, and the lst Battalion, at the same time, to assault Mte Gorgolesco, and to continue the attack northeastward down the ridge toward Mte Della Torraccia, where it would be passed through during the night of the first day, by the 2nd Battalion, which was to continue the attack and capture Mte Della Torracci.

In order to achieve surprise, the Division had ordered the assault to be carried out at night, and set the hour of attack at 2300; bayonets were ordered fixed, weapons were ordered to be carried, without ammunition in the chambers, and hand grenades were to be used to the maximum in the assault.

Company "C" was now detached from the Regiment and moved, during the night 14-15 February, to the forward areas closing in that night at Querciola, where they were attached to the 87th until D-2. The company's mission in these last four days before the Regimental attack was, originally, to patrol actively the lower slopes of Gorgolesco in an attempt to discover routes up the mountain. Such patrols were planned and then were immediately canceled on orders from IV Corps. These orders were apparently inspired by the great need of concealing Allied intentions with respect to our impending attack, and undoubtedly contributed to our later success. However, they did work a great disadvantage on the attacking companies, who, when the time came, made their effort against a heavily fortified mountain position, in darkness, without artillery support on initial objectives, and without knowledge of routes of approach, or knowledge of mines or ambushes on trails.

However, on the morning of 18 February, permission was at last given for three officers from Company "C" to accompany a Brazilian patrol into the slopes of Gorgolesco. Unfortunately BEF orders took them only a few hundred yards beyond their outposts; therefore the "C" Company officers detached themselves from the main body of the patrol and conducted sufficient reconnaissance on their to get a general idea of possible routes for one of the companies scheduled to take part in the attack. That night, a second patrol, composed entirely of 85th personnel, reached the summit of Gorgolesco before running into enemy outposts, and was thereby able to select a route for a second company.

Even with this information, however, the advance knowledge in possession of troop-leaders was pitifully slight. Even G-2 and S-2 information was largely limited to "probable" bunker locations.

During the night of 18-19 February, the Regiment completely closed into its final assembly area at the foot of Mte Belvedere and Mte Golgolesco. Here the following day was spent directly under the observation of the Germans, but concealment was so well utilized that as it was later learned, from captured prisoners, the Regiment's presence was not detected; hence, complete surprise for the impending attack was gained.

During the night and morning of 18-19 February, the 86th Regiment successfully captured Riva Ridge, and the stage was all set for the 85th to make its maiden entrance into combat.

At 2300 hours on 19 February the lst and 3rd Battalions crossed the line of departure and began ascent of the first two peaks, the 3rd Battalion on the left climbing the slopes of Belvedere, and the lst Battalion on the right on Monte Gorgolesco.

The 3rd Battalion was the first to encounter resistance, about 0100 hours it ran into heavy machine-pistol, machine-gun, mortar and artillery fire and grenades, but it continued the advance against constantly increasing resistance. Perhaps it is impossible for anyone to sense the difficulties of such an attack who has not been through one; it is certainly difficult to describe the experience of attacking a strong enemy, uphill, in terrain that is wholly unfamiliar, sown with mines, and in a pallid moonlight that silhouetted every figure that ventured across the snow. And when your rifle is unloaded, as ours were, and you move with only a grenade and your bayonet ready, it takes a supreme effort of the will to attack aggressively.

The summit of Monte Belvedere was first reported at 0410 hours under heavy artillery fire, by elements of Companies "I" and "L", who had achieved a partial encirclement of the objective. Here there was a short delay due to the death of Captain Walter Luther of Company "I", on the forward slope. He had gone out on reconnaissance, leaving orders for the Company to await his return; with him was Captain Gullixson of Company "L", who was pinned down by enemy fire and was unable to return to order the attacking companies to come on to the summit. Lt. Bucher, of Company "I", sensing that things were not going as they should, came forward, and under his direction the assault was completed. By 0615 hours the battalion was in possession of the objective, and reported that they were in fair condition but undergoing extreme artillery and mortar fire. Later investigation disclosed several 120 mm Mortar positions on the outer slope of Belvedere which inflicted heavy casualties on the battalion.

Abreast the 3rd Battalion, the lst Battalion advanced without difficulty until 0300 hours when it was subjected to heavy mortar fire. It seemed apparent that this was aimed fire, but that the German, suspicious of movement he had detected, was simply laying down his protective fires, although they caused heavy casualties, particularly in Company "C", they were not sufficiently directed as to halt the advance. By 0440 hours Company "C" had surrounded the objective, and was reported ready to assault, and by 0500 hours both "C" Company and "B" Company were assaulting the summit of Gorgolesco. By 0610 hours it was in the hands of the lst Battalion. Throughout the last hours prior to taking its objective, its progress had been slowed by a continuous enemy artillery and mortar concentration and by the presence of widely-dispersed and deep mine-fields. It was in these mine-fields that the majority of lst Battalion casualties were suffered.

By 0730 hours on 20 February, then, the initial objectives had been secured; both battalions were in fair condition-able, at least, to continue the attack as originally planned. The need to do so immediately was apparent; hostile artillery fire, only, was now being received, and for the moment the German was pulling back. Therefore, the 1st Battalion, as originally planned, committed Company "A", which until this time had been in battalion reserve. They crossed the ridge and carried the attack along the northeast ridge toward Della Taricha. They were accompanied by the machine-guns and 81 mm Mortar observers of Company "D".

The continuation of the attack was delayed almost an hour by heavy enemy fires, which now, in broad daylight, were carefully aimed. But by 0830 hours Company "A", under Captain Jerome C. Turner, was well along the ridge toward its final objective. Companies "B" and "C", after mopping up along the Belvedere-Gorgolesco line (Company "C" bagged seven additional Germans in the process) followed in a column of companies. A short time later the 2nd Battalion was ordered onto the ridge and soon followed the lst Battalion in Regimental reserve. The 3rd Battalion was occupied both in consolidating its own positions on Belvedere and in sending one company (Company "K", heretofore in Battalion reserve) to take over the Gorgolesco positions vacated by the lst Battalion.

Shortly after 1000 hours Company "A" succeeded in driving off the first enemy counterattack; which came from the northeast. This was the first indication that the enemy had been able to re-organize to any appreciable extent, and served as a forewarning that he would lose no chance to regain the ground he had lost. Midway to its objective, Company "A" entered heavy woods and encountered the strongest positions prepared by the Germans, which were designated as a defense against an attack from the southeast. Here they met a most stubborn resistance. and the effect of aimed artillery fires was, of course, made doubly devastating by tree-bursts. Our counter-battery fire was reasonably effective, and the close-in support by a group of P-47's, equipped with 500 pound bombs and rockets, eventually neutralized the hostile fire enough to permit the attack to continue. The Battalion's final objective was in our hands by 1750 hours. The day's work had brought the battalion forty prisoners.

At 1500 hours Colonel Barlow ordered the 2nd Battalion to pass through the lst Battalion and to continue the attack, with the mission of taking Della Torreccia that night. The lst Battalion was then ordered to defend to the north from its present positions. The lst Battalion of the 87th Regiment moved up to relieve our 3rd Battalion on Mte Belvedere, and the latter then moved to occupy a defensive position extending from Mte Gorolesco on its left to the left flank of our lst Battalion on its right.

Just before 1800 hours, 20 February, the 2nd Battalion passed through the lst Battalion, and immediately met strong resistance. It was informed that if it could reach the first high ground 500 yards beyond it could hold up there for the night and continue the attack at daylight of the 21st. By 2300 hours tanks had at last began to move up to the Gorgolesco-Taricha ridge to support the effort. During the dark, Company "G" pushed forward toward the Battalion objective for the night and captured it at 2100 hours and almost immediately had to fight off a strong counter-attack, accompanied by heavy mortar and artillery fire. This attacking enemy was identified as three companies of the German 4th Mountain Battalion.

Thus ended the first day of the Belvedere engagement. No official list of enemy killed that day is available; but ninety-nine were taken prisoner by the Regiment. Our casualties, considering the extreme difficulty of the operation and the strength and determination of the defenders, were no higher than expected. Sixty men of the 85th were killed during that 25-hour period and 169 were wounded. Of the deaths the lst and 3rd Battalions suffered twenty-seven and twenty-six respectively, and the wounded were in nearly equal proportions. The remainder of the casualties were divided between the 2nd Battalion, Service Company, and the Medical Detachment.

With the coming of daylight on the 20th, enemy artillery-and mortar-fires were continuously received. In addition to causing casualties, the enemy artillery created a tremendous problem in communications; wires were continuously having to be re-laid, especially between battalion command posts and the attacking companies, and the regimental and battalion communications sections were frequently called on for work of a heroic nature to keep lines in under heavy fire.

A unit which served admirably under these especially difficult conditions was the Regimental Medical Detachment. During this first day they maintained a splendid record in evacuating casualties and administering first aid, often under shell fire.

Returning to the 2nd Battalion which we had left with "G" Company repulsing a counterattack at 2100 hours, we find it confronted with what appeared to be a dangerous situation. Its advance had formed a gap of approximately 600 yards between itself and the right flank of the 1st Battalion which subjected wire and supply parties to the hazard of attack by infiltrating enemy patrols.

At 0430 hours on the 21st the Battalion began to receive a heavy shelling by the German Artillery. At this time the Battalion occupied an area heavily overgrown with large chestnut trees, and these trees greatly increased the effectiveness of enemy shells by causing 'tree-bursts', thus showering the unprotected personnel in open foxholes with a deadly hail-of shell fragments. The Battalion was completely at the mercy of this enemy artillery. The Germans had planted machine guns on each flank of the Battalion and fired tracer bullets about one hundred yards over the Battalion positions, thus clearly pointing out this position to the German Artillery.

In addition to this severe shelling, the Battalion had repulsed five separate counterattacks during the night. In spite of all these adversities which had befallen the Battalion, plans were made to renew the attack at 0600 hours.

By this time, the Battalion was, indeed, in a serious state; many casualties had been suffered. Company "H" suffered most heavily in the loss of leaders, having only one officer who was not killed or wounded. Among those killed was Captain Ernest Bennett, the Company Commander.

In addition to this, enemy activity had prevented supplies of food, water and ammunition from reaching the Battalion.

At this time, Lt. Col. Stone reported that the Battalion was in such serious condition that it could not resume as planned. Nevertheless, he was ordered by the Division Commander to press this attack vigorously and to until his Battalion was expended.

Upon receipt of these explicit orders, reorganization of what was left of the Battalion was immediately initiated, and the Battalion, at about 1300 hours, resumed its attack.

During the renewed advance, the Battalion was continuously subjected to the direct fire of German Artillery, particularly 88 mm, and casualties continued to increase. By 1900 hours, the Battalion had reached hill 1079, and there was ordered to remain for the night.

By the end of the 21st, the Regiment was extended from Hill 1079 to Mte Golgolesco. Casualties for the day were 27 killed and 109 wounded; of those, the 2nd Battalion suffered 24 killed, and 76 wounded.

During the day, the 1st and 3rd Battalions continued to occupy their defensive positions.

At 0700 hours 22 February, the 2nd Battalion resumed its attack with the mission of seizing Mte Della Terraccia. It immediately met such heavy resistance from the enemy that little advance was made. Enemy shelling was even more vicious than it had been on the previous day, and the German automatic-weapon fire effectively covered all approaches to the objective.

On the 23rd of February little actual change occurred in our lines. That morning Company "F" attacked again toward the summit and advanced 200 yards, there to be held up by 88's and automatic fire. Company "E" was simultaneously delayed for the same reasons, and now a heavy counterattack developed between the two companies. Company "G" was sent around to the right in a flanking effort, but was similarly halted by intense fires. This situation remained in effect until the late afternoon when the Battalion, badly depleted, was relieved by the 3rd Battalion of the 86th Regiment, who reached the summit on the 24th. The 2nd Battalion had fought its way to Taricha with heavy casualties, and had paved the way for the final assault, destroyed the enemy capacity for strong resistance; and now retired to Gaggio-Montano, where the new regimental command post had been established.

So ended the intense fighting for the most vital keystone in the German defensive system. By evening of the 24th the entire mountain-mass was in our hands, and it remained so. This important operation had not been achieved without its cost. During this period the Regiment lost a total of 109 killed, 338 wounded, and one missing in action. It had, indeed, been an expensive operation, but laid the groundwork for final victory.

During the remaining four days of the month, the enemy was content to shell our lines and send out occasional contact patrols, but no large scale effort was made to regain his lost ground. The men of the 85th began to tell themselves that they could now rest securely; each day that we held our ground we made our positions stronger. The Heavy Weapons Companies had mapped protective fires; the artillery was registered; and we had tanks in active support along the northeast ridge. A threat developed on the 26th, when we were warned of the probability of a counterattack of regimental strength; but this failed to materialize. Our only aggressive action, during the remainder of the month consisted of two combat patrols; one each from the lst and 3rd Battalions, which made enemy contact without casualties. During the morning of 28 February, the lst and 3rd Battalions were relieved on their positions by the Brazilian Expeditionary Force and withdrew approximately a thousand yards toward Gaggio-Montano for a two day rest.

The taking of the great mountain group had only been Phase A of the Division offensive; the attack was scheduled to continue on the lst of March, but poor weather postponed the operation until the 3rd. Even in this respect, however, the Division was fortunate; with the end of February came also an end of cold weather. Hereafter we had no new snowfalls, and within ten days the climate became almost springlike. This new phase of the attack was, like the first, to be limited in its objective, which was Monte Della Spe, a peak some seven miles beyond Della Taricha.

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By late in March it was becoming evident to even the most casual observer that the groundwork was being laid for another offensive. This belief was soon substantiated by receipt of detailed plans.

Again we were participating in an effort of IV Corps. The three divisions to be initially employed were the 10th Mountain, the 1st Armored, and the 1st Brazilian. And again, partly because of its past record of successes and in part because of the commanding terrain that comprised its sector, the 10th Mountain Division was to be the spearhead for the Corps action, The 85th and the 87th Regiments were to jump off and capture the ground, first, immediately north of us. Then it was expected that the 87th Regiment, with the 86th Regiment following, would veer to the northeast, in the general direction of Bologna, and that the 85th, after Hills 909 and 913 were seized, would advance steadily to the north, take Mte Rhigetti and Mte Bulgaro, and thence, move on to the town of Zacca before swinging to the northeast. The 85th was given a line of departure stretching from Castel d' Aiano on the left to a point midway across della Spe.

Within the Regiment the plan was for two battalions, the 2nd and 3rd, to start abreast, while the lst remained in support in Castel d' Aiano and acted as left-flank security for the Division. From this location the lst Battalion was to give supporting fires. The first objectives within the 3rd Battalion sector, on the left, were Hills 883 and 913, from which it would advance to take Rhigetti and Bulgaro, while the 2nd Battalion was assigned Hills 909 and 860, and ultimately Ca dell' Oste, Hill 870, and Montetertora.

The attack was scheduled for 0700 hours, 12 April.

It was realized that the German was stiffening his defenses, moving in additional troops-among which were Panzer elements, which fact indicated that he, too, was aware of impending action. In order to deceive him as to the time of our attack, orders were issued several nights prior to the attack for fifteen-minute artillery barrages to be fired nightly. Following these barrages both .30 and .50 caliber machine-gun fires were used to harass enemy positions. These concentrations of our fires were effective. Later, prisoners taken early in the action declared that, though they knew an attack was imminent, they had expected a night operation.

When D-Day arrived, skies were overcast, making impossible the air support the Army wished us to have. Therefore action was postponed for twenty-four hours; but on the 13th again the weather was against us, and it was not until 0945 hours on 14 April, that the 85th entered its toughest days of combat. On this day General Alexander, the Allied Commander of the Allied Forces in Italy, informed all Allied Troops that this offensive was intended to destroy completely the German Army in Italy.

Thirty-five minutes of the most intensive artillery and mortar fires any of us had seen blinded Hills 909, 883, 913 and 860. (footnote 2) During this barrage incendiary bombs were dropped by our supporting P-47's. These gave us a brief advantage in concealment as the two Battalions crossed the line of departure. They certainly left no question in the enemy mind as to the extent and seriousness of our intentions. And now, from the crossing of the line of departure the action became so complicated that it can best be told by describing individual battalion action.

The 3rd Battalion crossed promptly at 0945 hours with Company "L" leading, followed by the Company "M" machine-guns accompanied the attacking companies, while Captain England's 81 mm mortars (eleven of them, American, German, and Italian) supported the battalion from positions near Castel d' Aiano. Almost at once Company "L", with Company "K", following, swung slightly to the left with their attack aimed at Hill 883 (actually the Southwest nose of Hill 913) and the village of Pullano just to its left.

Company "L", under Lt. Eggleston, encountered little fire as, they crossed the line of departure. It was not long, however, before it reached the open slopes before the houses known as Pra del Bianco. By this time the terrific protective dust-haze had lifted, and it was subjected to heavy, aimed German mortar fire. It was near here that they first ran into the incredibly extensive and closely laid minefields which the enemy had sown during the weeks of preparation. Their time was well spent. These minefields are worth a moment's digression, for they showed a new high in destructive ingenuity. The only areas approaching the Regimental objectives not completely planted with mines and booby-traps were those indispensable to the enemy for his own patrolling activities. Oftener than not, double trip-wires were used, even at foot-level and the other chest-high; so that a soldier searching for one wire would inevitably trip the other. On the hillside, the entire slope was cut by hedgerows through which the advance must pass, and these were literally woven with trip-wires, some of release, some of the tension type. Many casualties were suffered as a result of these deadly instruments, which were readily identified by a body lying directly over a fresh hole blown under it. As quickly as possible paths were cleared through the field and taped; and soon the piles of mines, mostly of the Schu type were a common sight.

By 1015 hours Company "L" had reached the hedgerow running from east to west through Pra del Bianco and was receiving heavy mortar and small arms fire. A few minutes later Lt. Putman of "L" Company took a group of eight men with some prisoners, just captured, stormed the top of the company objective, meanwhile forcing the dejected Germans to designate enemy positions. However, our own artillery, in addition to the enemy's, was still falling on this section of the objective and he was forced to fall back. By 1100 hours the entire company had reached Hill 854, the last nose between it and its goal; by 1130 hours they were moving onto Hill 913, itself. A small group of men from Company "L" now made their way to the summit and held out there against the stiffest resistance until, when at about 1430 hours, the remainder of their company and Company "K" arrived. Now the objective was firmly held, but under exceptionally heavy automatic, sniper, artillery, and mortar fire, the latter including, respectively, shells of 170 mm and 120 mm caliber. The casualties were extremely high; on the summit of Hill 913, Lt. Eggleston, Commanding Company "L", reported that he had only twenty-eight men left in his company, and although this figure was later slightly raised, it is indicative of the cost of the objective.

By 1100 hours Company "I", led by Captain Bucher, had advanced to a point within 200 yards of its first objective, Hill 883. It was still followed by "K" Company. Both companies were receiving deadly sniper fire, and artillery and mortar fire from Monte Bulgara, to which they were necessarily exposed. Casualties, particularly in Company "I", were very heavy; so heavy that, even though the advance was slowly continuing, Captain Cooper was ordered to pass "K" Company through Company "I" and attack Hill 913 from the southwest. At the same time tanks were ordered up to assist Captain Bucher in the attack on Hill 883 but they failed to reach him. The lead tank struck a mine, and was disabled, and the remainder was held up behind the first tank. By 1430 hours, as mentioned, Company "K" had succeeded in joining Company "L" on Hill 913. But Company "I", even though passed through by Company "K", was still faced with a unique problem. Its orders had directed it, initially, to move west around Hill 883 toward Pullano in an effort to skirt the extreme left end of the wide minebelt that spread across the face of the Battalion objective. Exposed continually to observation and fire from Mte Bulgara, and suffering heavy casualties during this painfully slow process of probing its way forward through the endless mines, Company "I" was at last ordered to abandon its course, and to withdraw, and then to follow the route taken by Company "L" to Hill 913, and from this vantage point to attack Hill 883 from the northeast. Intense hostile fires prevented the completion of this mission before dark, but by late afternoon the Battalion objective was partly held by the 3rd Battalion.

It was impossible for the Battalion to advance beyond Hill 913, and finally, at 1800 hours Colonel Barlow ordered the 3rd Battalion to set up defense and to 'button up' for the night. It was a gruesome night; hostile artillery pounded the new positions continuously and there was little opportunity to evacuate the dead and wounded. Some indication of the price paid for this days successes-in the 3rd Battalion alone-can be given by the casualties in officer ranks. Of the twenty-eight company officers in the battalion, twelve were lost during the one day's action, five of them killed including Capt. Kenneth H. England, Commanding Company "M".

Because the 1st Battalion was, by virtue of its position, directly connected with the action of the 3rd Battalion, its activities can most logically be described now. Throughout the day its primary mission was to give supporting fires to the attacking battalions from positions in, above, and to the left of Castel d'Aiano; and to be prepared at any moment to take up the fight. Its location made it, also security for the left flank of the Division. During the daylight hours of this day, the 14th, the 81 mm Mortar platoon, under Lt. Chapin, fired well over 2000 rounds of ammunition of all types. Despite efforts to keep the tubes cooled, the charges on one round were ignited by the heat of the weapon before it reached the firing-pin. (Footnote 3)

Late that afternoon Company "A" with Lt. D'Ooge's platoon of heavy machine-guns from Company "D", moved up to take Hill 883 and to tie in there with the 3rd Battalion as a part of the new line. Although Hill 883 had been largely by-passed during the afternoon's fighting. "A" Company encountered no resistance in force. However, sniper activity in their area caused severe casualties throughout the night.

When the 2nd Battalion jumped off at 0945 hours, Company "E" was on the right, Company "G" on the left, and Company "F" in battalion reserve. The companies were commanded by Captains Hamner, Halversen and King, respectively. Company "E", almost at once, made its way to the top of Hill 860 with light casualties; but once on the hill began to receive concentrated fire from the front and both flanks. To their right, the 1st Battalion of the 87th Regiment was held up by a stiff fire-fight at Torre Iussi, and consequently Company "A" of the 87th Regiment was passed over Hill 860 to attack their objective from their left flank. However, the advance of the 87th Regiment was not assured until Company "G" could reach the summit of Hill 909, its first objective, thus removing enemy observation from the neighboring ridges. Hence Company "G"'s mission was a crucial one, one on which the initial success of the whole Division to some extent depended. By 1155 hours the company was deployed along the base of Hill 909, taking a punishing shelling from enemy bunkers located on its objective; by 1230 hours it had made its way almost to the summit, and company men were attacking the houses at Serre d' Aiano, just below the crest. It was here that Pfc. John D. McGrath met his death. He achieved the distinction of being the only enlisted man in the Regiment to be recommended for the Medal of Honor. The recommendation states that he personally knocked out three machine gun nests and that he killed, wounded, and put to route over fifty Germans. With the support of long-range machine-gun fire by Company "H", from Monte della Spe, and the support of elements of Company "E", moved over from Hill 860, the objective was taken before mid-afternoon. From here it was able to assist by fire, the 3rd Battalion attacking Hill 913.

Company "F", crossed the line of departure and by the middle of the afternoon was in position on Hill 909.

The 87th Regiment, on our right, had now passed through Torre lussi and was making its way toward the prominent pass, Bocca dei Ravari. To aid them, Colonel Barlow now ordered the 2nd Battalion to push forward along its newly won ridge-line to the northeast, to clear the eastern slopes, and to secure the left flank of the 86th Regiment. The Battalion was engaged in this operation when it was ordered to 'button up' for the night; to contact the 87th Regiment on its right; to send patrols forward for security; and to be prepared to continue the attack at daylight. All three companies now took up defensive positions, and Company "E" on the right, Company "F" in the center, and Company "G" on the western half of Hill 909. At 1815 hours the inevitable counterattack came; it was a local effort launched against Hill 909 from the north. Company "G" took the brunt of this counterattack and a platoon of Company "F which moved in as support, succeeded in beating off the enemy.

So ended the first day of the offensive for the 2nd Battalion. Its losses were high in killed and wounded; again among the battalion officers, nine were casualties, four of them killed.

It is not difficult to understand the reasons for the heavy losses in this day's work. First, although we may have been able to deceive the enemy as to the exact hour of our attack, there is no doubt, but that he knew many of our intentions. This was inevitable. The only possible route of advance, dictated by the terrain, pointed to a jump-off from the della Spe area, and this in turn had the effect of funneling the 10th Division's operation into a small, limited zone of action, and here, the enemy exercised his defensive talents to the utmost. The month following the capture of Monte della Spe and its adjacent peaks had given the enemy ample time to prepare his defenses and to plant the most extensive mine -fields the Regiment had ever encountered. These were the result of the fact that, the German was at last beginning to run out of high ground on which to defend and consequently to lose that great original advantage which he enjoyed throughout the entire Italian campaign. Each peak he lost pushed him closer to the Po, and meant that now, we would soon hold the dominating terrain and would be down his 'throat'. A psychological factor is worth mentioning, too. Among the prisoners taken that first day (mostly from the German 334th Division) was one who carried a diary. In it was recorded a warning that the 10th Mountain Division was about to attack and would not take prisoners. This sort of enemy propaganda had become customary since Monte Belvedere, and its effectiveness on his own troops was obvious from the fanatical resistance our Division thereafter encountered. During that opening day, 14 April, the attacking companies had frequently to dig the enemy out of bunkers and buildings at the point of the bayonet. The German resistance indicated that he regarded these hills, Hill 909, Hill 913, and to our right, the Rocco Ruffeno and the heights enclosing Bocca dei Revera, as the best position for a final stand in the Apennines.

Despite the ferocity of his resistance, however, the Regiment brought in a total of 114 prisoners before midnight of the 14th. They were surprised and shocked to learn that their General Kesselring had been transferred some weeks earlier to the Western front; they had all been informed immediately, however, of President Roosevelt's death on the 12th.

THE SECOND DAY

Casualties suffered on the 14th brought about several changes of command in both attacking battalions. Reorganization that occurred during the night placed Captain Finn in command of Company "L" (he had commanded Company "A" at Camp Hale, and had only two days previously joined the Regiment), Lt. Eggleston moved from Company "L" to take over Company "M". In the 2nd Battalion, Lt. Beck replaced Captain Halversen, killed on Hill 909. Captain Gullixson was given command of Battalion Headquarters Company, Captain Shepherd having been killed by a mine while on reconnaissance during the night of the 14-15 April.

Hostilities on the second day opened when enemy rocket fire from somewhere near Pullano landed in the lst Battalion area. Our jump-off took place at 0700 hours, preceded again by a heavy artillery concentration. Companies "K" and "I" led the attack for the 3rd Battalion, with Monte Rhigetti as their objective. Before they had advanced 200 yards, both companies received the heaviest fire yet experienced; the attack continued, but only as far as Ganobi, midway between Hill 913 and Rhigetti, where they were ordered to hold until the 2nd Battalion could come abreast and form a solid front. This was the farthest point of advance made by the battalion. Meanwhile, an enemy armored attack was rumored, and since the tanks assigned to support the 3rd Battalion had still been unable to reach the top of Hill 913, Lt. Col. Shelor sent them, with a platoon of riflemen from Company "L", to Pullano, which they managed to reach by evening of the 15th.

During the night of 14-15 April, the enemy had infiltrated back to Hill 860, to the right rear of the 2nd Battalion, and at just about H-hour, 0700 hours, opened up at close range with machine-gun and small-arms fire. At the same time automatic weapons on Hill 915, to the right flank, started claiming casualties among the companies poised for attack. At this time Captain King was wounded and Lt. Makin assumed command. Due to the heavy fire from the enemy and the difficulty encountered in obtaining adequate artillery support, the advance did not get under way until 1030 hours, and by that time a critical situation had developed, for the 3rd Battalion, on the left, had advanced almost to Canobi, and the 87th Regiment, on the right, had already taken Monte Pigna. Thus each of the flank units were seriously exposed. At approximately 1030 hours, one platoon of Company "F", supported by Company "E" and a section of machine guns of Company "H", successfully assaulted Hill 915, and the remainder of "F" Company pushed on to take Hill 898. Here a full company of Germans was wiped out, either killed or captured, and almost immediately a strong counterattack was launched by the enemy against Hill 898 and the old line on Hill 909. It was repulsed, but only with heavy cost to Company "F". At about this time Lt. Col. Seiss E. Wagner, until then Regimental Executive officer, assumed command of the 2nd Battalion.

After assumption of his new command, he determined to push the offensive to the utmost, and late in the afternoon of the 15th ordered all three companies to advance to newly assigned objectives. This led to a heroic exploit on the part of "G" Company. In its effort to close the existing gap between the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, which threatened the security of both Battalions, Lt. Beck, whose company strength, including all of his company headquarters personnel, now numbered only 58 men, took with him every armed man and rushed through point-blank fire down the slopes of Hill 909 in a desperate effort to close the gap in the line. The group was split, casualties (including Lt. Beck) cut the numbers still farther, and when the remainder under Lt. Tennenbaum, reached the foot of Hill 762, the force had dwindled to ten men. Here, however, they managed to hold their ground until dark, when they were withdrawn. By dark, the 2nd Battalion had captured all of its objectives. Company "F" now held Hill 813 and Company "E" had seized Hill 801 during the last few minutes of daylight. By this time the enemy realized that his strong defensive position was broken. Demoralized, he began to surrender rather than continue to fight. Companies "E" and "F" captured about one hundred prisoners during the late afternoon and evening.

At 1000 hours an order was received that changed the Regimental mission, and as a consequence the 2nd Battalion halted and consolidated its positions. The high cost in casualties of these two days had convinced IV Corps that further efforts to move directly north would probably prove too expensive in men and equipment to be justifiable. Therefore, the 85th, after two of the worst days of fighting it had ever experienced, was ordered to defend in place and to prepare to follow the 87th Regiment and the 86th Regiment as Division reserve.

During this second day, Company "A" moved from Hill 919 to 909 to take over the former 2nd Battalion positions, and Company "C", late in the afternoon, began to move with the 2nd platoon of Company "D", under Lt. Johns, to consolidate the ground vacated by the 87th Regiment on Hill 840, thus filling the growing gap between the two regiments.

These two days had been hard ones, indeed, for the 85th. We sustained a total of 462 casualties, 98 of them fatalities. The expense, however high, was not incurred in vain. Hills 909 and 913, because of their commanding height, controlled the entire Ruffeno Ridge, and once they were in our hands the inevitable happened. After the 85th had seized them, the 86th and 87th Regiments were able to push rapidly to the northeast across Monte Pigna, Rocco Ruffeno, and beyond. Our original plan had to be abandoned; but now the enemy defensive line was broken and we were in a position to exploit this success with a speed and thoroughness that indicated the attack might in fact be the "last offensive".

Now for three days the 85th retired from an active part in the attack. Its job on April 16, 17, and 18 was largely a defensive one, its role as security varying between flank and rear-guard. The advance of the other regiments was progressing rapidly and successfully, and we were often hard-pressed to keep pace with them. An immediate breakthrough into the Po Valley seemed very probable. Movement in the rear areas was extremely difficult; the road-net was limited in extent and capacity and the advance jammed it with every type of vehicle. The action became at times a hurried pursuit of the enemy, punctuated with strong but temporary resistance. Late on the 18th, the 85th (Custer) Division was on the right of the 10th Mountain Division, and the veteran lst Armored Division was on the left of the 10th Mountain Division. On the 18th the lst Battalion, followed by the 3rd Battalion began a long march, to overtake the 86th Regiment, through which it was to pass that night. Early on the morning of 19 April the 85th again took the lead. The 87th Regiment was on our left and the 85th Division on the right. The Regimental drive that now started was to make history.

Facing the lst Battalion, when it crossed the line of departure at 0800 hours on 19 April, were elements of three German divisions; the 90th Panzer Grenadier, the 8th Mountain, and the 94th Infantry. Its line of departure was the east-west section of the Montepastoro-Gorizia road where it turned north to follow the Rono River - our boundary with the Custer Division. The Battalion crossed in a column of companies: Company "C" under Captain Wright (wounded that afternoon and replaced by Lt. Decker), Company "B" led by Lt. St. Louis, and Company "A" under Lt. Coggins. The plan directed that Company "C" push along the high ridges to the left of the road, taking Monte San Michelo, and if possible, continuing until the last ridges were reached. Meanwhile Company "B", closely followed by Company "A", was to fight its way along the road proper, with no final objective assigned. The Battalion was to exploit every advance and continue as far as possible.

By 0900 hours, Company "C" had advanced almost 3000 yards, beyond Monte San Giovanni Vecchio, and was close to San Michelo. Here they ran into extremely determined resistance, and for a time the attack was delayed. The company was subjected to close-range self-propelled artillery fire as well as automatic fire. Our artillery was only intermittently effective. At the same time, "B" Company, advancing up the road and along the Reno river-bed against tanks and small-arms fire, occasionally encountered an automatic weapon position. Lt. St. Louis and his radio operator were killed while they were leading a squad in assault upon a machine gun. The command of Company "B" passed to Lt. Lang. By 1200 hours Gorzia had been passed, with our tanks giving supporting fire into the buildings, and at 1400 hours the company had passed through Calderino. In the hills to the right of us, across the river, the 85th Division was advancing, but at a point now 5000 yards to our rear.

After it passed Calderino, the lead company ran into deadly fire from hostile tanks, heavy artillery and 120 mm mortar shells, falling in the path of the advance, caused several casualties. Now from the vicinity of Calderino, Company "A" climbed back onto the hills to clean out snipers. The move served a second purpose in that it outflanked the forces still delaying Company "C" on San Michelo. By late afternoon Company "C" was on the summit.

Company "I", under Captain Bucher, had been following the 1st Battalion throughout the day mopping up as it went and standing ready to engage the enemy wherever needed. Now, the remainder of the 3rd Battalion was ordered forward to offer direct support if required and to be in position to pass through the lst Battalion and to continue the attack. The 2nd Battalion, also, came up on trucks from their former assembly area.

During the evening Company "B" pushed on through the road-junction of Osta and took Hill 223 and C. il Muccio. Later in the night they tied in with Company "I" on their left, for now the 3rd Battalion had swung sharply west from Osta and was preparing to advance again on the left flank of the 1st Battalion. They jumped off at 2000 hours and after a stiff fire-fight secured the final ridges to the immediate left of the lst Battalion. The 2nd Battalion made a night march and by morning had seized a three thousand yard frontage of the line extending to the left of the 3rd Battalion. By 0530 hours on 20 April all regimental objectives were taken. We held the last ridge of hills overlooking the Po Valley and the stage was set for one of the great historic moments in the Italian war.

At 0115 hours on 20 April, General Hays ordered one company from the 85th to move without delay, to seize and hold the first road-junction in the valley on the Highway to Bologna, the cutting of which effected the encirclement of the city, which was within sight a few miles to the east. By 0600 hours on the 20th, Lt. Coggins had taken this road-junction with Company "A", and was the first in the Regiment to enter the Valley. The months of tedious, heartbreaking warfare in the Apennines were at an end. It was, indeed, a historic moment.

By nightfall of 20 April, the entire Regiment was several thousand yards within the Po Valley and was occupying a portion of the Division defense perimeter with the 86th Regiment on the right and the 87th Regiment on the left. During the night there was great activity in rounding up large bodies of prisoners, which had been surrounded.

2. James Hickey's company   back

3. James Hickey says, "We had only two guns, mine and Cpl. Coleman, each had 1000 12.5 lb. rounds. The last few rounds we  fired fell short among our own guys - the guns were too hot! No one knows how many we killed."  back

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The entire character of the fighting altered during the remaining days of the war. With the break through into the valley, there came an end to the grueling ways of the mountains; the back of the German resistance was broken, and the battle became a fast pursuit with small local engagements. Suddenly the major concern had become one of keeping contact with the Germans. Flanks and rears were-if not forgotten-temporarily disregarded. Battalions, even regiments, moved twenty or thirty miles in a day. Even though men of the 10th Mountain Division had hoped that they would be relieved upon entering the valley, still there was profound satisfaction in being present for this dash across the Po Valley. We were, certainly, exhausted. Since D-Day the 85th had traveled many weary miles afoot and fought for seven days without respite-seven days that opened with the most costly operation we had ever undertaken.

Having reached the valley, the Regiment again passed momentarily to Division Reserve while the sister regiments carried the pursuit swiftly across the valley. We followed, reorganized quickly, did some patrolling, and engaged the enemy wherever we met him. On 21 April a new groupment was made: Task Force Duff, under the leadership of the Assistant Division Commander. In this force were the 2nd Battalion of the 86th, the 91st Cavalry Reconnaissance.

Squadron, and mixed elements of armor, signalmen and engineers. Task Force Duff now spearheaded the drive across the valley; the remainder of the Division following and mopping up as it went. Task Force Duff's mission was to reach the Po River ahead of the elements being pursued, and to seize the bridges before they could be destroyed. It was a race against time; every delay would lessen our chances. However, enemy resistance had been so disorganized by the rapidity of our advance that any forces of appreciable size had been cut off or by-passed. One result of this was that daily fire-fights of varying intensity occurred. Frequently it became the novel assignment of rear elements to take towns, capture prisoners, or construct road-blocks.

By nightfall of the 21st, Task Force Duff had reached the town of Bomporto and secured there the bridge across the Panaro River before the enemy had an opportunity to destroy it.

There was no time for rest. As the troops moved forward they accumulated an odd assortment of transportation: German trucks, cars, horses, wagons, carts, bicycles, motorcycles, occasionally a dashing Italian Fiat joined the Regimental column. On 22 April the 85th again assumed a leading role. The 3rd Battalion was ordered forward to relieve the 2nd Battalion of the 86th as the Infantry of General Duff's task force. This group was now acting as spearhead for the entire 5th Army. The 3rd Battalion joined them at Bomporto and the force moved on rapidly. They at last, reached the banks of the great river near San Benedetto Po at 0545 hours on 23 April; but not without incident. Near San Lorenzo, the column was halted by enemy fire. Immediately Colonel Shelor and his party, just behind the lead vehicles, made for a convenient ditch; and a second later a Panzerfaust made a direct hit on the jeep in which they had been riding. Lt. Col. Shelor was wounded, and Major Wikner took command of the Battalion. Now, Company "I" was directed to clean up remaining resistance, and when this had been done the column moved ahead again. But not very far. Almost immediately the force ran into a German motor-pool and another fire-fight resulted. Additional tanks were rushed up, and one platoon, under Lt. Hames, detrucked to wipe out the resistance. The remainder of the task force by-passed the resistance and continued on. Approximately seventy of the enemy surrendered to the "K" Company men. When the fight was over, not one man in the platoon had been hit, but two Germans were killed and three wounded and 169 more gave themselves up. Next the platoon captured a German vehicle to transport their catch, and when Lt. Hames turned the prisoners over to the cage near Bomporto, the total had risen to 350.

On the same day, the 22nd, the 2nd Battalion reached Carpi, which had been by-passed by the task force and was still in German hands. Company "E", under Captain Hamlier, was detached to clean out the city, and the rest of the Battalion continued on to Novi, where it bivouacked for the night. Throughout the day, the lst Battalion followed the route of the 2nd Battalion, and the following day, the 23rd, passed through them, and at 1030 hours reached Camatta, in position for the crossing of the river. The 2nd Battalion closed in shortly afterward. And now, in two and a half days, we had traversed the entire southern half of the valley and stood, on the banks of the River which for many months had seemed almost legendary in its remoteness.

The 10th Mountain Division drive did not halt even here for a moment. By the time Task Force Duff reached the river the bridges had been destroyed. Plans had to be immediately prepared for crossing the river. Originally the Corps effort had been expected to end upon reaching the river, and the crossing would be made by other units hence all heavy bridge equipment was far away, to the east. Now, however, the unanticipated early arrival of the 10th Mountain Division at San Benedetto Po made it imperative to follow up the advantage gained. Consequently, the crossing was made in assault boats of the 126th Engineers, (footnote 4) and, one delay following another. It was not until the next day that Treadway and pontoon construction commenced. This meant, of course, that the beachhead on the north bank had to be established and expanded without vehicles, and immediate supply of ammunition and rations improvised in any way available.

The majority of the troops, despite the terrific speed of the advance, had come most of the way on foot, only being able to take of occasional motor shuttles. The march across the valley, both north and south of the Po, is an experience that will never be forgotten. In every town the local citizenry advanced to meet us with gifts of wine, eggs, flowers or milk, with waving flags and cheers. The Partisans, too, were of great assistance in clearing out small pockets of the enemy by-passed; and would have been still more valuable had we been able to furnish them with the arms and ammunition they so badly needed.

It may strike one as curious, that the enemy should have continued fighting against such obvious odds as now faced him, but the Alps must have seemed an impenetrable barrier behind which we could not pursue him. He fought for his country-or under strongly enforced orders-even though he must have felt the war was over; and, too, perhaps, because of the old fear of retaliation by the Gestapo against his family should he surrender.

Late in the afternoon of 23 April the 85th commenced its crossing of the river at Camatta, slightly east of the 87th Regiment. The 3rd Battalion led off, reached the other shore and established their beachhead by 1830 hours. Next to cross was the lst Battalion, which was over, without casualty, by 2000 hours. The 2nd Battalion crossed during the night, and by daylight all three groups had well-established beachheads. The night had brought scattered enemy resistance and some strafing by enemy planes, but the operation, considering the prepared positions discovered, could have been costly, if not disastrous providing the enemy had manned them.

During the 24th the beachhead was expanded and made secure, reaching inland some three to four miles, while DUKWs worked throughout daylight hours to move essential supplies across the river. At 0730 hours, Company "E", was subjected to a heavy shelling which, it developed, was the artillery preparation laid down by the 85th Division prior to their crossing. When shortly afterward men of the Custer Division landed on the hostile shore, they were chagrined to find a lone private from Company "E" already present to receive them, and when questioned as to the reason for his being there he replied that he was searching for eggs for his breakfast.

That night, 24-25 April, the lst Battalion once moved out as spearhead. Its mission, to be largely accomplished on foot, was to clear the road-net leading to the north, its initial objective being the town of San Lucia, an important road-junction. However, Lt. Col. Wooley had been instructed by the Division Commander to exploit any advantage and to continue to the limit of his ability. At 0600 hours a fire-fight developed which men of Company "A" quickly terminated. The San Lucia was reached and taken by 0800 hours and the Battalion closed in for an hour's rest before moving on. At the next objective, another road-junction, Companies "A" and "B", the latter now led by Lt. Kerekes, dropped off to set up road-blocks while Company "C" and most of Company "D" continued on to Villafranca. Enroute to this city another fire-fight took place again successfully handled by the men of Company "C". Just as the column entered Villafranca, two German vehicles which apparently had entered the highway from a side road, sped into the city-from the south and were distinctly surprised to find the Americans there. They attempted unsuccessfully to get away. The machine-guns of Company "D" set them afire. Several of the enemy were killed, and sixty prisoners taken. By 1700 hours the great Villafranca Airport was in Regimental hands. Thus ended a forced march of over 25 miles, accomplished in less than 19 hours. One more prize fell into our hands; during the evening a Focke-Wolf 190 landed at the field, and though the pilot escaped in the excitement, the plane was taken intact. Several German vehicles were trapped that night in the roadblocks set up northern end of the city.

At midnight a new Task Force, commanded by Colonel Darby, who succeeded General Duff as the Assistant Division Commander, after General Duff had been evacuated because of injuries received when a tank struck a mine near the jeep in which he was riding, passed through the lst Battalion and headed for nearby Verona. On the 26th, the remainder of the 85th assembled in the vicinity of Villafranca, ready to take over the attack wherever assigned. About 0900 hours that morning Company "C", again on tanks, moved to the northwest to the town of Pastrengo with a mission of securing there the bridge across the Adige River. Late that evening Companies "A" and "D" joined them.

During the night 26-27 April, General Hays informed Colonel Barlow of a change in plan for the employment of the 10th Mountain Division. Rather than continue as before on the road to Verona and the north, we were to swing sharply to the northwest, heading for Lake Garda, and eventually, the city of Trento. Thus the last possible escape route of the enemy would be sealed. The various regiments were to alternate as Division spearhead for eight-hour periods, with the relief moving up by motors, and passing through the attacking organization. The 87th started for Lake Garda on the 27th; the 85th was to pass through them that evening and be relieved, in turn, by the 86th Regiment in the early hours of the 28th.

At 2000 hours on 27 April the 2nd Battalion, spearheading for the Division pushed through the advance aggressively, and by midnight they had made their way to Malcesine having marched the phenomenal distance of eighteen miles in four hours. Here they held until the 86th Regiment passed through them at about 0200 on the 28th.

The 3rd Battalion and the re-assembled lst Battalion followed the advance of the 2nd Battalion, and when the troops awoke on the morning of the 28th, they found rugged mountains rising from both shores of Lake Garda. The Alps had been reached, ending one of the most spectacular and unbelievable advances of the war. The 10th Mountain Division, trained and equipped primarily for mountain warfare, had actually out-fought and out-raced all other units in the successful effort to drive the enemy back to the wall and at the same time seal all the escape routes for hundreds of thousands of Germans in North Italy.

The war was not quite over; in the next days the 86th managed against strong resistance to reach Riva, at the north end of the lake, their way frequently blocked by the last-minute blowing of the tunnels along the shore. It was a hard fight, and a costly one, but shortly after the taking of Riva. the great day came. On 2 May 1945, the surrender of all German forces in Italy and Southern Austria was announced: complete, unconditional surrender.

It was a great achievement, and major credit for its accomplishment has gone to the 10th Mountain Division. It had fought uninterruptedly for twenty days, and in that time had advanced almost 120 miles; it broke the line that made the general advance possible, and in its race across the valley, which it had been the first to enter, outdistanced even motorized units. First into the valley, first across the Po River, first into the Alps-it was, indeed, a magnificent accomplishment, in the achievement of which the Mountain Infantry played a leading role.

For three months more the 85th remained in Italy, fully expecting imminent deployment, perhaps directly, to the Pacific theater. This came close to being realized. Not until we reached Florence on our way to the United States were we sure of thirty days at home before re-entering combat. In the intervening weeks the Regiment moved first to Brescia, then clear across Northern Italy to assist the occupation of Trieste, then being contested with the army of Yugoslavia. It was a very peaceful occupation, with the battalions established in Tarcento, Tricesimo, and Cividale respectively. During this time large numbers of the men had a chance to see most of North Italy; trips to Venice, Florence, Milan, Rome, and the Italian Riviera were made available. Late in June plans were formulated for climbing school in Austria, using the glaciers of highest peak, the Grossglockner.

On 20 July the day came for which we had all been waiting. That evening the USS Marine Fox sailed out of Naples harbor for New York with the 85th Mountain Infantry aboard; and it sailed with a superb sense of timing, for we arrived in New York harbor early on the morning of 10 August 1945, to be greeted with the news of Japanese acceptance of the Potsdam Terms. The war was over before most of us had reached our homes, there to enjoy a thirty day furlough. Fittingly, the 85th re-assembled at Camp Carson, Colorado, and there on 26 November, 1945, in the State that saw its beginning, the Regiment, having won two battle streamers-Upper Apennines and Po Valley campaigns-for its colors, was inactivated.

4. James Hickey says, "D Company was the first to cross the Po River. They were fired upon by a German 20mm AAA gun during the crossing, which rained shrapnel onto the men crossing the river. They later found the gun which was left unmanned and firing automatically. A huge pile of hot shell casings were piled around the gun. One member of D Company was burned in the foot by one of these hot casings. "  back

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